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SEEKING AN OBJECTIVE FOR
REGULATING INSIDER TRADING
THROUGH TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
James D. Cox*

ABSTRACT
Data summarized in the opening of this article document shows that inside trading is a growth industry. And, as deals get ever bigger, the growth
curve becomes steeper as more the data confirms intuition that the more
who know about a good thing the more who will seek to harvest its benefits. Even though insider trading appears to have thrived during the fifty
years after Texas Gulf Sulphur, we gather in this symposium to celebrate
the decision. But why? As developed below, the Second Circuit’s landmark
decision gave way to the Supreme Court’s erection of a fiduciary framework that this article reasons is unhelpful. Little remains of Texas Gulf
Sulphur. This article seeks to explain why the decision remains important.
It counsels that insight to why and how to regulate insider trading lies in
closely considering Texas Gulf Sulphur, whose rich facts but opaque reasoning in combination enable it to endure as a guidepost by which to locate
at least two mutually supportive rationales, developed here, for regulating
insider trading.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. FROM THE CLARITY OF PARITY OF
INFORMATION TO THE MIST OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. FINDING PURPOSE IN TGS’S FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. PROTECTING THE REWARD FOR INITIATIVE . . . . . . . . . . .
B. NECESSARY PROPHYLAXIS EXPLANATION . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE PATH FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

699
706
707
708
710

T

RADING on inside information is a growth industry. Studies repeatedly and consistently report that much of the price effect of
financially significant corporate activity occurs before the particular event is publicly disclosed.1 Mergers and takeovers are particularly

* Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University. The author is grateful for the
excellent research assistance of Mr. Brent M. Caldwell in preparing this article.
1. Initial studies of insider trading examined whether insiders (officers, directors, and
certain beneficial owners) who are required to report their trading pursuant to § 16(a) of
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rife with insider trading abuses in the pre-announcement period.2 For example, one study found significant evidence of insider trading an average
of twelve days prior to the first public announcement of a merger; about
40–50% of the price gain experienced by the targets of takeovers occurs
before the actual takeover announcement.3 Because these transactions
customarily involve significant market premiums to the acquired firm,
and because their planning and execution involve a large number of individuals, each of whom faces the temptations of certain gains and uncertain detection if they trade on their secret knowledge, acquisitions are rife
with evidence of insider trading.4 What is most revealing in recent studies
is not that insider trading occurs on a massive scale in connection with
many market-moving corporate events, but that the degree of such trading is proportional to the number of professionals engaged in marketmoving transactions.5 For example, a review of 1,859 merger deals from
1996 through 2012 found evidence of insider trading of options in 25% of
all deals.6 Moreover, an increase in the number of insiders involved in
deals appears to be driving this.7 For example, Professors Acharya and
the Securities Exchange Actabuse the informational advantage they enjoy by trading on
nonpublic information. Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. BUS.
410, 413 (1974), and Joseph E. Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141,
1148 (1976), each find that insiders garnered significantly abnormal returns via their reported purchases and sales of their firm’s shares, an observation consistent with insiders
deploying confidential corporate information to their personal advantage. Not captured by
Jaffe and Finnerty is the extent, if any, that the same insiders share their good fortune by
tipping friends and relatives so that the ill-gotten gains are more pervasive than those
reaped by the director, officer, or beneficial owner of a reporting company that files
§ 16(a) reports.
Furthermore, traders adjust their use of inside information to avoid detection by regulators, such as by not trading close to announcements when such activity might trigger increased scrutiny. Bin Ke, Steven Huddart & Kathy Petroni, What Insiders Know About
Future Earnings and How They Use It: Evidence from Insider Trades, 35(3) J. ACCT. &
ECON. 315, 315–16 (2003) (finding that stock sales by insiders increase three to nine
quarters prior to announcement of news of declining earnings, but not in the two quarters
just before the announcement).
2. See Manish Agarwal & Harminder Singh, Merger Announcements and Insider
Trading Activity in India: An Empirical Investigation, 3 INV. MGMT. & FIN. INNOVATIONS
140, 145 (2006).
3. See Arthur J. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider
Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855, 866 (1981) (examining 194
merger announcements); see also Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661, 1662 (1992). The stock market is not the only venue where
the insiders reap the rewards; data confirms that put and call options are astutely used by
insiders to reap gains in the pre-takeover period. See Tom Arnold, Gayle Erwin, Lance
Nail & Terry Nixon, Do Option Markets Substitute for Stock Markets? Evidence from Trading on Anticipated Tender Offer Announcements, 15 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 247, 247
(2006); Narayanan Jayaraman, Melissa B. Frye & Sanjiv Sabherwal, Informed Trading
Around Merger Announcements: An Empirical Test Using Transaction Volume and Open
Interest in Options Market, 37 FIN. REV. 45, 46 (2001).
4. Keown & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 866.
5. See Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Informed
Options Trading Prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading? 27 (Oct. 26, 2015)
(working paper) (on file with author).
6. Id. at 2.
7. See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, More Insiders, More Insider Trading:
Evidence from Private-Equity Buyouts, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 500, 500 (2010).
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Johnson found a correlation between the number of insiders and the likelihood of insider trading on any one deal.8 This extends to institutional
involvement.9 In another study, the same authors report that as the number of banks monitoring a given firm as part of a lending arrangement
increases, the more likely there is going to be evidence of trading of
credit default swaps on nonpublic information, suggesting those banks
are using inside information to hedge against risk.10 But, not all the preannouncement market movement can be attributed to insiders and their
tippees; there is evidence of abundant price-discovery efforts by “uninformed” traders who mimic the insider’s trading, so a certain amount of
“piling on” accompanies the illicit trading of those in the know.11
If there is a silver lining in the pervasiveness and price impact of insider
trading, it is that such insider trading not only drives securities prices in
the direction of the post-announcement equilibrium level, but also appears to be related to such price discovery efforts, and may well have the
effect of reducing other forms of compensation that insiders and their
advisors may have obtained.12 Such “positive” byproducts, however,
should not be considered in a vacuum.13 The merits, if any, of insider
trading should be considered in the context of the public policy advanced
by circumscribing the use of material nonpublic information. The thesis
set forth below is that the facts of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.14 (hereinafter “TGS”) provide an excellent backdrop to divine a public policy
supporting present day insider trading laws. Far more useful than the
empty fiduciary rhetoric that now frames ticklish factual inquiries are instrumentalist considerations that are not far below the surface of TGS.15
I. FROM THE CLARITY OF PARITY OF INFORMATION TO
THE MIST OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
The data summarized above reflects the great challenges regulators
face in deterring insider trading. The challenges were not present in the
facts of TGS, which appear quaint by contemporary standards.16 This
may call for pause in celebrating the decision’s half-century life. If the
8. See id.
9. See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives,
84 J. FIN. ECON. 110, 112 (2007).
10. See id.
11. See Meulbroek, supra note 3, at 1661–62.
12. See M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505,
513, 542 (2011) (collecting data reflecting that executives who are subject to fewer constraints in trading their company’s stock experience reductions in other forms of
compensation).
13. See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the
“Chicago School,” 1986 DUKE L. J. 628, 635, 642 (claims of efficiency associated with insider trading are overstated because insider trading is a slow and clumsy method to impart
newsworthy information vis-à-vis a clarion corporate announcement).
14. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843–47 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
15. See id.
16. See id. at 843–47.
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regulation of insider trading appears weak in light of repeated studies of
its pervasive presence, what then is the benefit of continuing to champion
TGS, the primogenitor of our regulatory thrusts? Certainly the uninitiated should question why TGS is pedestalized when so many decisions
over the last fifty years provide multiple qualifications to its simple, broad
prohibition. This question is further justified in light that there have now
been so many Supreme Court decisions refining and sometimes rejecting
key features of the decision.
Even though much has intervened in the last half-century, major business organization casebooks continue to include TGS.17 For example, in
my business organization class, I continue to divide class time fairly and
equally between discussing TGS and the tapestry woven by various congressional, SEC, and Supreme Court forays into the realm of insider trading regulation. My preoccupation with TGS is not due to inertia
grounded in dog-eared notes, but a natural embrace of the richness of the
TGS facts and the issues they presented to the court. TGS’s unique facts
allowed the court an enduring context to thoughtfully explore a range of
technical questions, such as: what constitutes a material fact when the
information turns on an outcome that is uncertain to occur; what it means
to be “in possession” of proscribed information; what the disclosure obligations of officers and employees are to the board of directors; and what
constitutes the public disclosure of inside information.18 Indeed, no other
case since TGS has similar richness of facts for such pivotal issues to be
developed. What truly sets TGS apart is its opacity on the core of the
case: why insider trading is proscribed. Its vagueness naturally invites
conjecture on how its carefully developed record overcomes that weakness to divine a solid foundation for regulating insider trading.
The most distinguishing aspect of TGS is the sharp contrast its reasoning provides to the later Supreme Court decisions cabining insider trading
regulation in the midst of fiduciary duty law. TGS straightforwardly
observed:
[The] Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information. The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in
the securities of a corporation has “access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone” may not take “advantage
of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
is dealing,” i.e. [sic] the investing public. Matter of Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). Insiders, as directors or management
officers are, of course, by this Rule, precluded from so unfairly dealing, but the Rule is also applicable to one possessing the information
17. See, e.g., ROGER LEROY MILLER, BUSINESS LAW TODAY, THE ESSENTIALS: TEXT
SUMMARIZED CASES 621–22 (Erin Joyner et al. eds., Cengage Learning 10th ed.
2014).
18. See Texas. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848, 849, 856, 870.
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who may not be strictly termed an “insider”. . . .19
From this parity of information perspective, the opinion broadly
concludes:
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing
it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do
so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.20
The imposition of the disclose-or-abstain rule on “anyone” follows naturally from the court’s view that market participants expect corporate insiders will use corporate information for corporate and not personal
purposes.21
The mystical fiduciary orientation that now guides insider trading regulation began with Chiarella v. United States.22 Justice Powell’s opinion in
Chiarella stopped further resort to parity of information as the lynchpin
for insider trading regulation.23 Chiarella holds that the sine qua non for a
duty to disclose on anyone’s part is the presence of a fiduciary
relationship.
[L]iability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. . . .
[Chiarella] was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the
sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal
market transactions.24
Thus, Vincent Chiarella, a mere employee of a printer hired by a tender
offeror, escaped criminal conviction when he traded in the shares of
forthcoming tender offer targets based on the knowledge he purloined
through his work with the printer.25 Chiarella never explores why the fiduciary relationship is appropriate for the securities laws that were enacted for the express purpose of protecting participants—investors,
market intermediaries, and shareholders—in impersonal markets. Indeed, we can easily understand that the enactment of the securities laws,
and thereby the imposition of mandatory duties that operate in a variety
of contexts, were intended to overcome deficiencies long-recognized in
the common law.26 For these reasons, importing fiduciary duty analysis
from the common law is not a convincing approach to defining obligations under the federal securities laws. At common law, corporate insiders owe no duty to disclose any kind of material information before
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
See id.
See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
See id. at 248.
Id. at 230, 232–33.
See id. at 224.
See id. at 233.
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trading.27 This neither supports TGS’s holding nor does it justify the limit
on TGS’s reach imposed by Chiarella. Aside from such illogic, it would
seem inconsistent with the intended public policy of the federal securities
laws that were enacted to add disclosure duties where they were absent at
common law.28 These oversights might well explain why the fiduciary
analysis quickly and seriously unraveled in two subsequent Supreme
Court decisions.
Chiarella’s analysis is at best a triumph of formalism. Had Vincent
Chiarella purchased the bidder’s shares (believing the acquisition would
be viewed as beneficial to the bidder as well as the target), the requisite
fiduciary relationship would have existed and his conviction upheld.29
Hence, Chiarella’s fate turned not on well-grounded policy anchored in
the objectives of the securities laws, but instead upon fortuity of which
company’s shares he purchased.30 In so reasoning, Chiarella embraced
the artificial distinctions that for decades prevented common law deceit
actions from reaching insider trading, such as imposing liability on insiders who purchase shares from existing stockholders, but not when the
insider sells shares to outsiders.31
Setting aside quibbles naturally surrounding formalism, there remains
the larger question that is not addressed by Justice Powell—Why would
fiduciary duty law proscribe Chiarella’s trading in the bidder’s shares
more readily than the target’s shares? Agents, such as Chiarella’s employer, are burdened by a duty not to use information secured through
their relationship that would harm or act contrary to the principal’s interest.32 It is easy to conjecture many ways by which Chiarella’s trading
poised such harm. Because Chiarella repeatedly traded through the same
broker on his advance knowledge of prospective bidder targets, he created a serious risk that the broker, who through surmise did ultimately
understand Chiarella’s information advantage, could have sold his knowledge of Chiarella’s trading to hedge funds. Those hedge funds’ advance
trading would increase the price of the prospective target shares with the
effect of either reducing the bidder’s anticipated gains or prompting the
bidder to increase its bid to assure a sufficient premium over market was
offered for it to succeed. Thus, a focus that a fiduciary threatens the principal only by trading in the principal’s shares is at best myopic.
27. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660–61 (1933) (no disclosure duty owed by
directors and officers when trading on an impersonal market such as an exchange). Even
the earlier “special facts” cases tracing their roots back to the Supreme Court in Strong v.
Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), addressed only instances where the plaintiff and defendant
dealt with one another through a common intermediary and not through the more anonymous trading mechanisms that characterize trades in organized markets.
28. See generally Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory Relief and Simplification,
17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, 260, 269 (2017).
29. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
30. See id. at 231.
31. See id. at 233–34.
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–8.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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In United States v. O’Hagan,33 the Supreme Court provided for the
protection of the principal’s interest by embracing the misappropriation
theory of insider trading, while also holding that the fiduciary talisman
was not needed under insider trading and tipping prosecuted under the
Rule 14e-3.34 O’Hagan held that a lawyer who learned the identity of a
target of a takeover through the confidential relationship his firm had due
to the firm representing the bidder violated Rule 10b-5 by purchasing call
options for the target’s shares.35 O’Hagan reasoned that O’Hagan procured the confidential information by failing to disclose he would use the
information to trade, and through a broad reading of the “in connection
with” requirement, the Court deemed O’Hagan’s nondisclosure of his intent to trade to be in connection with his subsequent trade.36 O’Hagan
thus squares the circle behind the fiduciary mist of linking O’Hagan’s infidelity to the principal.37 Nonetheless, O’Hagan fails to link its analytical
gymnastics with any broader policy objective than proscription of misappropriating market-moving information. Its loose construction of the “in
connection with” language for the purpose of upholding O’Hagan’s conviction overcomes Chiarella’s formalism, but does so with reasoning that
appears to be a little more than sleight of hand.38
O’Hagan is even more elliptical in its analysis of Rule 14e-3. O’Hagan
had challenged the government’s prosecution under the provision on the
ground that the jury was not instructed on the necessity of finding a preexisting fiduciary duty owed by O’Hagan.39 The Supreme Court held no
fiduciary relationship need exist for such a charge, relying on the broad
rule-making authority the SEC enjoys under § 14(e) to adopt rules that
would be a meaningful prophylaxis to fraudulent conduct in connection
with tender offers.40 Even though O’Hagan deftly and definitively excludes the fiduciary rubric from that provision’s reach, it clouds the result
by not fully explaining just why the rule-making authority the SEC enjoys
under § 10(b) is to be understood as less sweeping than that under
§ 14(e).41
The Supreme Court further distorts the fiduciary concept in Dirks v.
SEC.42 Ronald Secrist, after ceasing his employment with Equity Funding, famously tipped Raymond Dirks, informing him that the life insurance policies mutual funds making up most of Equity Funding’s assets
were “vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent corporate practices.”43
33. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
34. See id. at 634–44. See generally Transactions in Securities on the Basis of Material,
Nonpublic Information in the Context of Tender Offers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2017).
35. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655–56, 661. See generally Employment of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
36. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655–56.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 661.
39. See id. at 700–01.
40. See id. at 671–76.
41. See id. at 672–73.
42. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
43. Id. at 649.
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While investigating the accuracy of Secrist’s report, Dirks shared the
alarming information with several funds, who over time sold $16 million
in Equity Funding shares.44 The gigantic fraud by Equity Funding was
ultimately revealed; the SEC reflected its gratitude to Dirks by disciplining him through a letter of censure.45 Dirks, believing he was the victim
of SEC overreach, pursued his case to the Supreme Court, where Justice
Powell once again invoked the fiduciary framework.46 The Court held
that a tip is proscribed “only when the insider [Secrist] has breached his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach.”47 Thus, the tippee’s ability to trade depends on whether the selective disclosure “constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty.”48
This, the Court stated, is to be judged by the objective criteria of
“whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from
his disclosure.”49 Gains identified in Dirks, and affirmed decades later in
Salman v. United States,50 are pecuniary gains, “reputational benefit that
will translate into future earnings,” and a “gift of confidential information
to a trading relative or friend.”51 The Court proceeds to state that absent
a personal gain, there is no breach.52
Each of these examples appear well within fiduciary boundaries. But
what if the tipping insider gains no benefit by making the selective disclosure other than peace of mind? For example, the lawyer in O’Hagan advising Grand Metropolitan on its secret plans to make a hostile bid for
Pillsbury Company could fear that Grand Metropolitan’s takeover of the
hometown firm would harm Minneapolis.53 Certainly there would be a
breach of her fiduciary duty to the client if the lawyer tipped Pillsbury of
the plan so as to enable Pillsbury to successfully defend itself. This selective disclosure, however, is not within any of the bases Dirks identifies as
making the selective disclosure improper.54
Buried in Dirks and not referenced in Salman, is what could be the
Court’s quest for the objective factors it identified that render a tip
improper.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 651–52.
46. See id. at 666.
47. Id. at 660.
48. Id. at 661.
49. Id. at 662.
50. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (rejecting defense that Dirks requires the government to establish that the tipper’s goal in making the selective disclosure
is to garner something of tangible value, like money or property). Salman thus triggered
the Second Circuit in United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), to reject its
prior requirement that the government must establish the tippee was aware that the tip was
made to obtain such a tangible reward and that mere ties of family or friendship alone
were not sufficient. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
51. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64. The same objective factors were embraced most recently in Salman. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 422, 427.
52. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
53. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647–48, 659.
54. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64.
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Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and
trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market
analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It is commonplace for analysts to “ferret
out and analyze information,” . . . [citing to reasoning in the SEC’s
opinion disciplining Dirks] and this often is done by meeting with
and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders. And
information that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for
judgments as to the market worth of a corporation’s securities. The
analyst’s judgment in this respect is made available in market letters
or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.55
Dirks, seeking a standard that facilitates the analysts’ worthy function
of unearthing nonpublic information, inserts objective criteria, premised
on gain to the tipper, as the litmus for determining whether a tip is improper.56 More broadly, under the empty “fiduciary” rubric, Dirks does
much more by acting instrumentally to incent the lawful pursuit of nonpublic information, i.e., by not conferring gain to the tipper.
The full import of Dirks’ requirement of objectively observable benefits to the tipper can be understood against the facts of a pre-Dirks decision, SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.57 Even though Bausch & Lomb was
experiencing rapid growth in revenues after introducing soft contact
lenses, rumors circulated within the investment community regarding
possible product recalls and overstocking by customers.58 There ensued a
feeding frenzy by various analysts who focused on the company’s chairman, Schuman.59 Employers of a few of the most aggressive analysts
traded Bausch & Lomb shares during this period, and the SEC alleged
they did so in reliance on wrongful tips by Schuman.60 All the charges
were ultimately dismissed, many on the grounds that Schuman deftly conformed his replies to analysts to facts already publicly available.61 In the
sole instance where Schuman selectively disclosed material nonpublic information, he quickly took steps to make the selectively disclosed information publicly available.62 Then, in finding that Schuman did not act
improperly, the court emphasized that his actions were careless, but did
not rise to the level of scienter required for violations of the antifraud
provision.63
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 658–59.
See id. at 658–59.
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 1228–29.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1236–37.
Id. at 1236, 1243.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1237.
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This opinion is instructive because its close analysis of the facts documents how intense and persistent financial analysts can be in their trade
of “ferreting out” financially significant information.64 Although their actions were likely seen by Schuman and other Bausch & Lomb officers as
nettlesome, the facts reflect the profession of the financial journalists and
their role in the price discovery process. The case is also prescient of the
holding in Dirks by judging any wrongfulness of Schuman’s selective disclosure by objective criteria—he moved to correct the gaff by taking steps
to make the information publicly available soon after becoming aware of
his mistake, and he garnered no financial reward for himself as a result of
the tip.65
Even though the above reflects that the Supreme Court embraces
strong public policy reasons for conditioning proscription of tipping on
objective indicia of personal gain, the Court did not examine why a selective disclosure for personal gain should be proscribed. Thus, we see that
in the one area—tipping liability—where the Court has provided the
most explanation for its holdings, we are still adrift. Overall, the fiduciary
principle may have some analytical value in explaining relationships that
support a violation in particular instances, but as a matter of explaining
why those relationships should justify proscription of trading or tipping,
fiduciary law the case law is an empty vessel.
II. FINDING PURPOSE IN TGS’S FACTS
TGS’s embrace of a goal that investors enjoy equal access to material
information was utopian in its time and lacks even less salience in conceiving today’s markets.66 Broad claims that securities markets must be
“fair” as well as the claims that the insiders’ informational advantage are
antithetical to fairness, are each out of step with many demonstratively
unfair practices that prevail in contemporary capital markets.67 Colocation of trading facilities, the ability of a suitor to engage in market
purchases before announcing its hostile bid for a target, and the practices
whereby some vendors (for a fee) provide some investors with earlier
access to market-moving information persist in today’s markets.68 The
prevalence of such practices questions any claim that investors truly believe information is equally accessible.69 Nonetheless, not only was such
inequality within TGS’s facts, but the justification for embracing inequality can also be found in those same facts while, at the same time, justifying the regulation of insider trading.
64. See id. at 1230.
65. See id. at 1243.
66. See Janet Austin, What Exactly is Market Integrity? An Analysis of One of the Core
Objectives of Securities Regulation, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 237 (2017).
67. See id. at 227, 235–36.
68. See id. at 220–21.
69. See id. at 231.
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The first step to locating a basis for regulating insider trading is TGS’s
finding that the initial core drilling began the process whereby TGS
would ultimately announce it had discovered staggering amounts of valuable minerals.70 The visual assay of that core drilling, the famous K-55-1,
was determined to be material based on the trial testimony of mining
reporters, who explained how the defendants engaged in extraordinary
trading in TGS shares and options immediately upon learning of the richness of the visual assay.71 What the court could have emphasized in its
holding was that, without waiting for the formal assay of K-55-1, senior
management instructed the on-site drilling crew to withdraw and
launched a program that would ultimately lead to TGS engaging in a variety of subterfuges to enable it to secretly purchase vast holdings in the
vicinity of K-55-1.72 The company’s treatment of knowledge of K-55-1 not
only supports a holding that it is material, but also points toward a justification for proscribing insider trading.
TGS had no duty to disclose its knowledge of K-55-1 to those from
whom it purchased property.73 Indeed, its concealment of its identity as
the purchaser, while no doubt materially misleading, is not actionable at
common law.74 TGS, in its purchases of property in Timmins, Ontario,
unquestionably failed to disclose information material to selling landowners; it would have been important to each seller to know that the visual
assay of initial core drilling portended a large discovery of copper and
zinc (and a few days later, after a formal assay, TGS learned that silver
was also discovered), and that the actual purchaser was a large multinational mineral firm who concealed its identity behind various strawmen it
employed.75 Nonetheless, established doctrine compelled no such disclosure to the hapless selling landowners.76 Through this common law principle, the law provides a powerful reward that encourages value-increasing
behavior with the ultimate objective of putting property to its highest and
best use. If the rule were otherwise, TGS would have invested less, if at
all, in the global search for minerals that led to the startling discovery in
Timmins, Ontario. Disclosure of the content and promise of K-55-1 to
existing landholders would surely have driven the costs of purchasing the
parcels of land higher.77 This is because landholders could be expected to
demand their fair share of the expected value of the discovered minerals
as well as because TGS was very likely competing with other mining com70. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843, 847 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
71. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 848; see also Alan M. Weinberger, Forever Young: Texas Gulf Sulphur
Rules at Fifty, 45 SEC. REG. L. J. (SPRING 2017) 1, 9–10.
74. See Weinberger, supra note 73, at 9–10.
75. See Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843, 847–48.
76. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent
Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1608 (1999).
77. See Weinberger, supra note 73, at 5.
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panies for parcels of land.78
TGS simultaneously recognizes TGS’s right to use its secret knowledge
in real estate markets and calls for material nonpublic information to be
equally accessible in securities markets.79 But, TGS does not develop why
securities markets should call for greater protection of investors against
informational advantages than are permitted in other markets, such as
the real estate market.80 Each property owner in Timmins, Ontario, could
in theory have punched their own hole in the Earth’s mantle to determine
whether the family home was more valuable if used as a quarry rather
than a bucolic setting with great fishing. A non-disclosure rule accordingly rewards TGS for taking the risks of committing its resources to pursue a strategy that could result in a more valuable use of the property. If
in the process of purchasing Timmons acreage, TGS’s agents selectively
tipped selling landowners that their land contained high quantities of copper, zinc and silver, as seen earlier, that disclosure would clearly breach
the agent’s duty to TGS.81 The agent’s tip erodes the advantages of TGS’s
incentive behavior with consequential harm—the landowner may not sell
at all or may demand a higher price. Worse still, a competing bidder may
emerge, free riding on TGS’s discovery efforts, and would thus be able to
bid more for the property, since it would not have any discovery costs to
recover. These fears underlie the broad principle that applies, which is
that information the agent obtains in connection with the agency is to be
used in furtherance of the agency, not against the principal’s interest.82
The employee defendants in TGS did not reveal to Timmins landowners their secret knowledge of K-55-1.83 Nonetheless, their trading and tipping posed the same risks to TGS’s ability to exploit its discovery. It is
reasonable to fear that trading, certainly as massive as was carried out by
the TGS defendants, could have alerted markets and TGS competitors of
on-going material, secret developments at the firm. If this surmise is plausible, then much like the result achieved in the law of agency, discussed
above, proscription of the agent’s threatening conduct would be a reasonable prophylaxis.84
B. NECESSARY PROPHYLAXIS EXPLANATION
The protection of property interest justification for insider trading developed here sits poorly with the enforcement experience for insider trading. Few private suits for insider trading are maintained; most
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
denied,
84.

See Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1608–09.
Weinberger, supra note 73, at 2.
See id.
See discussion supra Part I.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–8.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843–47 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
394 U.S. 976 (1969)
See discussion supra Part I.
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prosecutions are by the SEC or the Department of Justice.85 But such
centralization of insider trading enforcement flows naturally from the offense. Insider trading is a crime of stealth so that detection entails costly
market surveillance procedures. These procedures are maintained by regulatory bodies, as they monitor compliance with a wide range of legislative and administrative directives designed for the protection of investors
and the efficient function of capital markets. In this oversight function,
identifying insider trading is something of a byproduct of a broader mission of the securities laws, such as assuring that companies make timely
release of market-moving information, investor orders are efficiently and
fairly executed, and stock prices are free of manipulation.
To be sure, TGS did not lack the resources to prosecute civilly an
agent’s harmful misuse of its information. One reason for authorizing the
state to pursue insider trading, even when the most visible threat is only
to the private interests of the owner of the inside information traded on,
is the natural advantage the state enjoys in surveilling markets for insider
trading. Individual firms are likely unwilling to invest in expensive technology to monitor the individual firm’s stock price and volume to detect
insider trading and tipping that affects the firm. On the other hand, monitoring across thousands of publicly traded securities by securities regulators enable the fixed oversight costs to be spread so that the detection of
misconduct is more efficient.
The protection of private property interest justification can thus be extracted from the facts of TGS. But it is by no means the sole persuasive
justification. As seen, the protection of private property approach is
anchored in the common law, and public prosecution is justified by concerns for the efficient protection of private interests. Disquiet nonetheless
arises from having such a private view of an area that now enjoys a rich
history of public concern. When hedge fund officers are prosecuted for
trading on tips from insiders, the proceeding is seen not as protecting a
particular individual’s private interest but rather vindicating the public
interest. The government’s commitment to detection and prosecution efforts could be justified on such private concerns. Equally disquieting is
that if insider trading regulation is premised solely on the protection of
property interest of the information’s owner, this understanding could
easily devolve into a laissez-faire approach. That is, pursuant to the protection of private property approach, the firm that “owns” the material
nonpublic information can freely license others to trade on the information. Thus, as Todd Henderson’s study of executive pay arrangements
found, firms that provide fewer limits on their executives’ trading pay
lower compensation to those executives; any shortfall in what such executives receive from their firm is garnered by insider trading gains from
unsuspecting investors.86 This indeed is the fear of such a privatized view
85. See Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, and Executive Compensation, 50 CASE W. L. REV. 291, 298 (1999).
86. See Henderson, supra note 12.
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of insider trading. One can hardly be prosecuted on a theory of misappropriating if the owner of the information authorizes trading on that
information.
Once again, TGS’s facts suggest a strong public reason for regulating
insider trading. One of the great mysteries of the case is why TGS managers on April twelfth issued a bland, and to some extent discouraging,
press release downplaying rumors that the company had made a large
mineral discovery.87 That release had marginal impact on the stock’s
price.88 Four days later, TGS issued a second press release, touting the
discovery and ultimately driving the stock’s price upward.89
The opinion never explains why such different announcements could
be issued in such a short time. The earlier announcement ultimately gave
rise to a settlement with investors, who sold their TGS shares in reliance
on that announcement.90 TGS sets forth the trading history of the various
insiders, which reveals that some of the defendants purchased a fair
amount of TGS stock in the interval between the two press releases.91
Thus, in TGS, two of the major defendants traded in the interval between the misleading April twelfth press release and the corrective April
sixteenth press release.92 To be sure, each had purchased TGS shares
before the misleading press release, but essentially doubled-down after
the release.93 Indeed, the second largest block of shares traded by any of
the TGS insiders occurred in the interval between the misleading release
and the corrective public release.94
Against this record, we can premise an important justification for insider trading: by proscribing insider trading and tipping that yields a personal benefit to the insider, the law removes an incentive that insiders
may have to delay the release of inside information. Stated differently,
with investors benefitting from the early rather than later release of information, legal rules can better implement that objective by proscribing insiders who delay the release of information to enable them to exploit
their secret knowledge of the information by trading on it.
III. THE PATH FORWARD
Since the landmark decision in TGS, insider trading regulation appears
to have functioned well. Calls for regulatory action did arise when the
Second Circuit decided United States v. Newman so that the prosecution
of remote tippees, such as hedge fund traders, would be seriously hobbled
by a demanding requirement that the prosecutor establish the tippee’s
knowledge that the tipper had received a tangible benefit by the im87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 845.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 846–47.
See Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308, 310–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 847.
Id.
Id. at 845.
See id. at 847.
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proper selective disclosure.95 These fears were swiftly dashed in
Salman.96 Similar concerns of threatening gaps surrounded Chiarella only
to be overcome by the broad interpretation of the “in connection with”
element by the O’Hagan court.97 Nonetheless, the puzzle continues: Why
do we deploy non-trivial levels of public resources to detect and prosecute insider trading and tipping? While it is sweeping in its own justification for proscribing insider trading, the unparalleled rich facts of TGS
also provide a useful background for identifying a few reasons why the
law is not only just, but also contemporary in its content.

95. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014).
96. See generally Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
97. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).

